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CONTRIVED CONFLICTS: 
THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE BASICS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
F. Scott Kieff † 
ABSTRACT 
Asked by conference organizers to consider the impact of the 
Supreme Court on intellectual property this millennium, this essay 
offers the view that the Supreme Court’s intellectual property 
decisions by its present members generally are premised upon what 
may be viewed as contrived conflicts among bodies of law.  
Proceeding from this faulty foundation, the Court’s efforts to 
resolve those conflicts subsequently have generated bodies of 
judge-made law that frustrate in important ways the basic statutory 
framework of intellectual property law.  Examples of cases 
employing this problematic approach include Bonito Boats, Dastar, 
Warner-Jenkinson, Festo, TrafFix, and Holmes.  Avoiding the 
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contrivances not only would have left intact congressional action 
that the Court has not held to have been improper in its own right, 
but it also would have better promoted the normative goals these 
regimes were designed to achieve.  Far from suggesting any 
particular business outcome in any of these cases, the essay 
proceeds from a comparative institutional analysis to show how 
decisional frameworks different from the ones the Court used 
would better achieve the basic goals and institutions of the 
particular statutory regimes of intellectual property law at issue in 
these cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This conference directs attention to “The Impact of the 
Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Law this Millennium.”1  
This essay offers the view that the Supreme Court’s intellectual 
property (“IP”) decisions by its present members generally are 
premised upon what may be viewed as contrived conflicts (that is, 
they essentially create a “straw man”).  The essay also shows how the 
Court’s efforts to resolve those conflicts then have generated 
bodies of judge-made law that frustrate in important ways the basic 
statutory framework of intellectual property law.  Without 
suggesting that the process of statutory construction is easy or that 
gap-filling is not important, the essay instead shows how the Court 
 
 1. 2004 William Mitchell Law Review Intellectual Property Law Conference 
“The Impact of the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Law this Millennium” 
held April 24, 2004, in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
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essentially began such efforts in these cases from faulty 
foundations; and, proceeding from these poor foundations, built 
pernicious bodies of case law.  Avoiding the contrivances created by 
the Court would not only have left intact congressional action that, 
at least so far, the Court has not held to have been improper in its 
own right, but it also would have better promoted the normative 
goals these regimes were designed to achieve. 
The particular cases discussed are Bonito Boats,2 Dastar,3 Warner-
Jenkinson,4 Festo,5 TrafFix,6 and Holmes.7  Although the cases are 
 
 2. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) 
(holding that state law against so-called “plug molding” of boat hulls was 
preempted by federal patent law). 
 3. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (holding 
Lanham Act does not prevent unaccredited copying of uncopyrighted work). 
 4. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) 
(holding that patent claims that are not infringed literally may still be infringed 
under the judge-made rule called the “doctrine of equivalents” to allow patentees 
flexibility). 
 5. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 
(2002) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents is cabined by the judge-made rule 
called “prosecution history estoppel” to allow third parties more certainty in 
knowing what will infringe a patent). 
 6. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) 
(holding existence of expired utility patents in which certain design elements were 
mentioned created sufficiently strong evidentiary inference of design’s 
functionality that the design was not eligible for trademark or trade dress 
protection). 
 7. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 
826 (2002) (holding that Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction must be 
determined using the same “well-pleaded complaint” rule that is used to 
determine federal question jurisdiction in the federal court system and therefore 
the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over case in which complaint did not 
allege claim arising under federal patent law, but answer contained patent-law 
counterclaim). 
  To some extent the College Savings cases also reveal a contrivance.  See 
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999) (holding congressional efforts to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity for states from federal trademark law not supported by a sufficient 
factual record of infringements by states to be a valid exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment paragraph 5 due process power); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (same, but for 
federal patent law).  In these cases, it is not clear whether the contrivance lies with 
the Court or with Congress.  The issue in these cases is whether Congress had 
adequate evidence of insufficient remedies for state infringements to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment protection of due 
process.  Either state infringement turns out not to be an issue, in which case the 
attempted abrogation was based on a contrivance that remedies for such 
infringement were inadequate; or these remedies are indeed inadequate and the 
decision to overturn congressional efforts was based on the contrivance of 
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procedurally proper in that each is associated with a conflict in case 
law that arose between different lower courts, and in that sense are 
of the type generally considered to be well-suited for Supreme 
Court intervention, this essay focuses on the substantive law aspects 
of the conflicts on which the cases are premised and shows how the 
Court’s approach on this level is in each case essentially premised 
on a contrivance.  That is, for each split among bodies of lower-
court case law, the Court essentially adopted the approach 
consistent with the body of judge-made law that was itself based on 
a substantive contrivance. 
In most of these cases the nature of the contrivance is the 
putative existence of a conflict within or among federal IP regimes,8 
between IP and antitrust regimes,9 between federal law and state 
law,10 or between federal IP law and court administration on the 
one hand and totally unrelated areas concerning the intersection 
between state and federal power on the other hand.11  In each case, 
the analytical framework the Court uses to resolve the conflict 
triggers important pernicious ripple effects for the IP law regimes 
that effectively undermine the very legal institutions the regimes 
create.  What is more, these regimes are normatively important for 
facilitating innovation, competition, and market entry, and for 
ensuring fidelity in the information flow necessary for a smoothly 
operating market. In addition, the Court continues to recognize 
 
insufficient ultimate evidence to support such congressional action, even if 
insufficient at the time the statute at issue in those cases was passed. 
  To be sure, the Court did decide cases during this same time period that 
are not assailable on these same grounds, including Markman and Pfaff.  Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 
U.S. 55 (1998). 
 8. Bonito Boats is premised on a conflict between federal patent law and state 
law against a particular type of copying.  Dastar is premised on a conflict between 
copyright law and trademark law.  Warner-Jenkinson and Festo are premised on a 
conflict between different aspects of patent law.  TrafFix is premised on a conflict 
between patent law and trademark law.  In Holmes, the core business issue turns on 
the same problem as TrafFix. 
 9. Bonito Boats, TrafFix, Dastar, and Holmes are each of this type in that the 
opinions in those cases seem to be driven by concerns about the perceived 
potential for the existence of too many IP rights in any particular asset to trigger 
competition or antitrust concerns.  For more on the economics of this issue see 
infra Part III. 
 10. Bonito Boats and College Savings cases turn on issues of federal preemption 
and of state immunity.  Similarly, in Holmes, the Court’s approach is driven by 
concerns about the interface between federal and state power, as discussed in 
more detail infra in Part III.D. 
 11. Holmes is of this type, as discussed in more detail infra in Part III.D. 
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that they are within congressional power.  That is, they are both 
properly justified and authorized. 
The essay proceeds in Part II to elaborate on what is meant by 
the basics of intellectual property law.  Part III reveals the nature of 
the contrived conflict in each case as well as alternative frameworks 
for deciding the same issues.  Part IV offers improvements to the 
underlying conceptual framework to expressly address the 
perceived problem of too many IP rights that seems to motivate the 
opinions in these cases.  Far from suggesting that the ultimate 
business outcome in these cases should have been different, Part V 
concludes the essay’s comparative institutional analysis by calling 
attention to the pernicious precedential impact of the reasoning in 
these cases. 
II. THE BASICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Although the normative case for legal protection of 
intellectual property is a topic of debate, substantial literature 
suggests that the dominant view favors these regimes.12  Not only is 
this normative view recognized with approval by the Court, the 
Court does not challenge the view that Congress has the power to 
promulgate the statutes that create the institutional framework for 
the positive law IP regimes.13 
Patent law, copyright law, and trademark law operate to 
facilitate the commercialization of subject matter that, respectively, 
is useful, creative, embodies goodwill, and is not deceptive.14  These 
regimes have evolved over time through extensive debate; and each 
embodies particular institutional choices about how to implement 
 
 12. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, 
PAULINE NEWMAN & F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 38-71 (3d ed., 2004) 
(reviewing philosophy and economics of debates over intellectual property and 
collecting sources). 
 13. Patent and copyright laws are promulgated pursuant to express 
authorization in Article 1 of the Constitution, while the trademark laws are 
promulgated under the general Commerce Clause power of Article 1 that is now 
recognized to be quite expansive.  Compare In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 
(1879) (holding trademark laws to be improper exercise of Commerce Clause 
power because they regulate activity that is not sufficiently interstate) with Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that even growing wheat for personal 
consumption in one’s own back yard has sufficient nexus to interstate commerce 
that it may be regulated by Congress using Commerce Clause power). 
 14. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (elucidating 
commercialization theory for patents and trademarks). 
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what generally are seen to be consensus goals. 
Recognizing that these regimes can, and in many respects 
should, continue to change, a central argument of the essay is that 
when change is made to these regimes it should be made with the 
benefit of the fully informed debates that are present within each 
regime.15  For purposes of this essay, the “basics” of each regime 
can be taken as the institutional framework of the statutes that were 
properly promulgated by the legislature and signed into law by the 
executive.  The central problem with the approach the Court 
adopts in the cases discussed in this essay is that it begins by 
misunderstanding the institutional frameworks set up by these 
statutes and then proceeds to frustrate their operation.  Such 
unpredictable changes made ex post by the Court frustrate the 
important ex ante incentives and coordination benefits these 
regimes otherwise provide, and through which they best operate. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT IP CASES OF CONTRIVED CONFLICT 
The cases of contrived conflict discussed below can be 
considered to be of two types.  In the first type, the Court 
essentially pretends that something is present in the IP regimes 
when actually it is not.  The Court then identifies a conflict 
between that contrivance and some other aspect of IP and reshapes 
the IP regimes to resolve the conflict.  Cases of this type are Bonito 
Boats, Dastar, Warner-Jenkinson, Festo, and TrafFix.  For the second 
type, the nature of the contrivance is the mirror image of that in 
the first type.  In the case of the second type, which includes only 
Holmes, the Court essentially ignores something about an IP regime 
that allows it to avoid conflict with other regimes.  As with the first 
type, the Court then identifies a conflict between that contrivance 
about IP and some other regime and reshapes the IP regime to 
resolve the conflict. 
A.  Bonito Boats and Dastar: Contriving a Right to Copy 
The contrivance in Bonito Boats is that federal patent law 
creates a right to copy. In the case, the Court decided that this right 
to copy would be frustrated by the state law at issue, which 
 
 15. This view of the “basics” is also explored in F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. 
Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, Stanford Law 
School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 2004 Working Paper # 275, 
at 4-6, forthcoming at __ GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___ (2004). 
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regulated one particular form of copying boat hulls, called “plug 
molding.”16  The Court then invalidated the state statute under the 
doctrine of conflict preemption, based on the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution.17 
There are several problems with the Court’s reasoning.  There 
is no right to copy, indeed no affirmative right at all, that is 
conveyed on the public by patent law, or for that matter by 
copyright or trademark law.18  These IP regimes only create under 
certain situations certain specific rights of exclusion.  The mere 
absence or expiration of any one of those specific rights of 
exclusion says nothing about a third party’s affirmative right to use 
the subject matter such a right otherwise might have covered.  
Indeed, that use often is restricted, if not outright blocked, by many 
other IP rights, regulatory regimes, and police powers.19 
The Court essentially rejected, or glossed over, these 
arguments by suggesting that the purpose of the state statute was 
somehow in conflict with a purported “strong federal policy 
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent 
protection.”20 But this analytical framework is unworkable because 
it would seem to extend to any state law that interferes with a right 
to use or copy.  Consider, for example, a state law against cheating 
on exams—or to be closer to the case, a contract term against plug 
molding.  What is more, the Court’s analytical framework may 
 
 16. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144-45 (citing FLA. STAT. § 559.94 (1987)).  
To be sure, the reasoning explored in this paper is not new and indeed was more 
thoroughly set forth in the opinion by Judge Rich in the case that was in conflict 
with the decision by the Florida Supreme Court in Bonito Boats.  See Interpart 
Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J.) (no preemption because 
patent law says nothing about a right to copy and because the state statute did not 
even prevent copying—it merely prevented one form of copying).  Similarly, the 
reasoning of Bonito Boats is not new either and its roots can be found in the earlier 
Sears and Compco cases.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).  As reviewed in 
detail throughout CHISUM ET AL. supra note 12, Sears and Compco did not raise as 
many alarms as Bonito Boats because these earlier cases came so soon after the 1952 
Patent Act.  It took the Court until 1980 to for the most part recognize the total 
overhaul in the framework of patent law that was implemented by the 1952 Act. 
 17. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168. 
 18. Compare, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151-52 (“[T]he federal patent laws 
must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use . . . .  
We have long held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter 
of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.”). 
 19. Concerns about the potential for a good or service to be blocked by many 
IP rights are discussed infra in Part IV. 
 20. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168. 
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totally eviscerate the rights of exclusion that these statutes are 
designed to create, and are both properly justified and authorized.  
That is, every IP right, market regulation, and even other police 
power regulation, will to some extent impact competitive economic 
concerns of the type that also underlie each of the federal IP 
regimes. What is more, to anyone informed by public choice 
theory, every IP right, market regulation, and other police power 
regulation can be seen as motivated at least in part by its impact on 
these same competitive economic concerns. 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit’s alternative analytical 
framework for conflict preemption, called the “extra element test,” 
does not suffer these shortcomings and indeed facilitates the 
smooth operation of each IP and competition law regime, federal 
and state alike.21  The state statute at issue in Bonito Boats would be 
analyzed easily under this test because liability under it turns on a 
host of elements that are totally unconnected to patent law, 
including copying via the plug mold technique.  Even closer cases, 
such as those involving state laws regulating statements about 
patents themselves, can be decided using the extra element test.22 
Indeed, this same “extra element” analytical framework also 
works well for resolving potential conflicts among areas of federal 
law.  As the Federal Circuit explained: 
By adding a bad faith requirement to a § 43(a) [false 
advertising] claim in the context of this case, we give 
effect both to the rights of patentees as protected by the 
patent laws under ordinary circumstances, and to the 
salutary purposes of the Lanham [Trademark] Act to 
promote fair competition in the marketplace. As thus 
understood, there is no conflict between the demands of 
the Lanham Act and the Patent Act, and a patentee is 
easily able to comply with both Acts. Furthermore, patent 
law is not frustrated because bad faith marketplace 
statements concerning patents do not further the 
purposes of the patent law.23 
 
 21. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (exploring interaction between patent law and a state law providing a 
business tort for interference with contract) 
 22. See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (no conflict-type preemption of various state law claims 
based on publicizing an allegedly invalid and unenforceable patent in the 
marketplace as long as the claimant can show that the patent holder acted in bad 
faith in publication of the patent, which is the “extra element” beyond patent law). 
 23. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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Regrettably, the Dastar decision to prevent false advertising 
cases over material that happens to lack present copyright24 totally 
overlooks approaches like the “extra element” test, which although 
crafted for patent law would work equally well for copyright law.  
Dastar instead is premised in part on the same contrived right to 
copy25 notion from Bonito Boats, which makes no sense for the 
reasons explored above.  Dastar is further based on the additional 
contrivance that federal false advertising law under the Lanham Act 
§ 43(a) would prevent copies of uncopyrighted works from being 
made.26 The particular analytical framework the Court employs in 
Dastar is to interpret the word “origin” in § 43(a) not to cover the 
concept of authorship and therefore not to allow as a matter of law 
a suit for false advertising where the alleged falsity relates to 
authorship.27  This contrivance about the power of § 43(a) runs the 
risk of eviscerating the carefully crafted balance struck by the legal 
institutional framework set forth in the Lanham Act. 
Rather than turning on some conceptual conflict between § 
43(a) and other areas of law, the established analysis for § 43(a) at 
least used to be simply a matter of the actual facts of the case.  If 
the reasonable consumer were misled as a matter of fact then there 
would have been liability under that statute.  In the Dastar case, for 
example, to have ensured the avoidance of liability, the defendant 
could have published the work with a label disclaiming connection 
to known earlier publishers.28  The point is that the alternative 
approach the Court adopted creates new law about the types of 
falsity not governed by § 43(a) that run counter to the purpose of 
 
 24. See 539 U.S. at 23. 
 25. Id. at 33 (discussing putative “right to copy”). 
 26. Id. at 35-38 (discussing “serious practical problems”). 
 27. Id. at 31-36 (discussing meaning of “origin”).  To the extent the case 
actually turned on the meaning of this word in the statute, those interested in a 
different result might consider simply seeking to have Congress amend the statute 
to recite, for example, that the term “origin” shall be interpreted to include (1) 
authorship; or perhaps, more broadly, (2) any features of the good that are 
proven to be salient to the decision by the public to purchase or not. 
 28. Such a disclaimer of authorship would achieve the Lanham Act goal of 
maintaining truth in advertising without suggesting some type of authorization.  
See id. at 36 (suggesting incorrectly that somehow a § 43(a) cause of action would 
leave the defendant in an untenable bind: “On the one hand, they would face 
Lanham Act liability for failing to credit the creator of a work on which their lawful 
copies are based; and on the other hand they could face Lanham Act liability for 
crediting the creator if that should be regarded as implying the creator’s 
‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy”). 
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the statute and the expectations it created in the marketplace.29  
Not only does the Court’s approach frustrate the statute’s narrow 
goal of promoting the smooth operation of the marketplace by 
encouraging truth in advertising and other dealings, but it also 
frustrates the generally important ex ante incentives and 
coordination benefits the statute had created. 
B.  Warner-Jenkinson and Festo: Contriving a Need for Flexibility 
and Certainty 
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson decided that patent law includes 
a so-called doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”) based on the 
contrivance that the patentee needs added flexibility or breadth.30  
This case generated the inevitable response by the Court in Festo 
that cabins the DOE based on the contrivance that third parties 
need added notice and certainty about patent claims.31  The 
analytical framework generated by these decisions to give both 
flexibility and notice is unworkable and fails to give either the 
flexibility or notice that motivated the Court’s analysis. 
What is more, it overlooks that patent law’s statutory disclosure 
rules in § 112 of the Patent Act allow patentees to obtain this 
flexibility and breadth while at the same time providing third 
parties with notice and certainty.32  These disclosure rules make 
sense because they impose on the patentee at the time of filing the 
duty to provide important information about the patent and 
because the patentee is the lowest-cost provider of this information 
and the lowest-cost avoider of ambiguity associated with that 
information.33  At bottom, because the patent system promulgated 
 
 29. See CHARLES E. MCKENNEY AND GEORGE F. LONG, III, FEDERAL UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT § 43(A), Ch. 1 (discussing evolution of the statute to 
encompass the broad definition of falsity about any salient feature of goods and 
services). 
 30. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 31. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 32. See F. Scott Kieff, Property and Biotechnology, in CHISUM ET AL. supra note 12, 
at 318-23 (showing how as a matter of positive law and practice the disclosure rules 
of section 112 can operate better than the DOE for both patentees and third 
parties and citing F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registration and the Law and Economics of 
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 99-105, 109-14 (2003) (discussing 
the normative case for the disclosure rules and showing how they are a better 
institutional choice—in terms of minimizing social costs—for allowing both 
patentees and third parties to manage the problem of claim breadth than other 
institutional approaches such as the DOE)). 
 33. Id. 
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by the 1952 Patent Act itself provides both flexibility and notice, 
the very conflict the Court attempts to resolve between these two 
principles is both contrived by the Court, and, ironically, then 
enflamed by the case law the Court promulgated to resolve it. 
C.  TrafFix: Contriving Functionality 
The TrafFix case is premised on the contrivance that 
everything in a patent application is “functional” as a matter of 
trademark law.34  The focus of the TrafFix case is whether 
something is unavailable for trademark protection because of the 
trademark doctrine called “functionality.”35 Under the Court’s 
analytical framework, there is a “heavy” presumption that anything 
mentioned in a patent application is treated as “functional” and 
therefore not protectable, as a matter of trademark law.36  This 
presumption risks making large areas of commerce outside the 
reach of the trademark law because often the providers of a 
particular good or service will seek both patent rights and 
trademark rights. 
The alternative analytical framework for determining “utility” 
or “functionality,” long established in trademark law, considers 
whether the overall trademark in question is, as a matter of fact, 
superior “in function . . . or economy of manufacture” to available 
alternatives.37  This test is more predictable and maintains the full 
scope of trademark protection authorized by statute. 
D.  Holmes: Contriving a Need for Consistency 
The nature of the contrivance in the Holmes38 case is really a 
mirror image of the contrivances in the other cases explored above.  
While the Court in those cases essentially erects a “straw man” and 
thereby fabricates a conflict, the Holmes Court in effect assumes 
away a conflict.  The nature of the Holmes contrivance is that two 
totally distinct bodies of statutory law with two totally orthogonal 
 
 34. 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 29-30 (discussing functionality). 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J.) (collecting sources).  But see TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 
(“There is no need, furthermore, to engage, as did the Court of Appeals, in 
speculation about other design possibilities . . . which might serve the same 
purpose.”) 
 38. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
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purposes are in conflict if they operate differently because they 
happen to employ the same short phrase.  The operative phrase at 
issue in Holmes is “arising under,” as it appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1338, 
which governs the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction, and in 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, which governs any federal court’s jurisdiction over 
general federal questions.39 
While the jurisprudence of § 1331 general federal question 
jurisdiction is driven by important constitutional considerations of 
federalism, the jurisprudence of § 1338 is driven by totally separate 
considerations.  First, the jurisdictional choices made by § 1338 are 
mere matters of court administration internal to the federal system 
and so are within congressional power.  Second, the particular 
change § 1338 implements is essential to ensure the effective 
operation of the legal institutional framework of the 1952 Patent 
Act.  Just as Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act to statutorily over-
rule errant case law, it passed the 1982 Federal Courts 
Improvement Act (which promulgated § 1338) to rectify the thirty 
years of case law in the regional circuits that was ignoring the 
changes of the 1952 Act.40 
 
 39. Id. at 829-30 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338). 
 40. See F. Scott Kieff & Gerald J. Mossinghoff, A Reemergence of Regulation at the 
Interface Between Patents and Antitrust, 4 ENGAGE 97 (2003) (reviewing history of the 
statutory changes to implement the present patent system): 
The 1952 Patent Act marked a monumental change for the patent 
system.  Both of its major innovations—the revival of contributory and 
induced infringement in Section 271 and the replacement of the 
subjective requirement for invention with the objective requirement of 
nonobviousness in Section 103—have major implications for the 
interface between patents and antitrust.  More specifically, when 
antitrust regulators consider questions like “are patents too broad?” 
they run the risk of ignoring the statute’s objective standards of 
patentability.  Similarly, when antitrust regulators consider questions 
like “are patent licenses or refusals to license permissible?” they run 
the risk of ignoring the statute’s express safe harbors, which set forth 
what does not constitute misuse. 
The Supreme Court itself took quite some time to recognize the 
importance of these innovations of the 1952 Act.  Over ten years passed 
after implementation of the 1952 Act before the Supreme Court in the 
famous Graham case instructed lower courts to apply the framework of 
the new Section 103 requirement of nonobviousness.  Almost thirty 
years passed after implementation of the 1952 Act before the Supreme 
Court in the famous Dawson case instructed lower courts to apply the 
framework of the new Section 271 provisions about what does not 
constitute misuse.  Today’s regulatory review of the patent system 
should not lightly set aside these hard fought innovations in the patent 
system, especially without offering some reason other than those 
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Even if the Holmes decision is correct in the narrow sense, 
given the particular wording of § 1338 at present,41 the case offers 
no positive or normative reason why the statute could and should 
not be re-written using different language so as effectively to 
reverse the case.  Indeed, unless remedied by statute, after Holmes 
we are likely to see a repeat of the behavior the regional circuit 
courts have demonstrated in the past, which effectively eviscerated 
the legal institution of patent law by simply avoiding the changes 
implemented in the 1952 Patent Act about obviousness, antitrust, 
misuse, statutory subject matter, utility, and indirect infringement.42  
For example, as then Second Circuit Judge Thurgood Marshall said 
about patents during the Senate’s confirmation process for his seat 
on the Supreme Court in 1967: “I haven’t given patents much 
thought, Senator, because I’m from the Second Circuit and as you 
know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit.”43 
IV. IMPROVING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
At bottom, the Court’s decisions to intervene in each of these 
cases appear to be motivated by a view that too many IP rights can 
be bad in unduly taxing or retarding downstream development of 
the subject matter protected by IP.  This view is at least reminiscent 
in general of the well-rehearsed debates in the literature about 
relative strengths of property rules or liability rules and relative 
impact of transaction costs and coordination benefits.44 
But this view also seems to be tied to two areas of 
contemporary law and economics literature in particular.  The first, 
called “anticommons,” explains how ill-formed property rights 
accompanied by excessive opportunities for regulatory and 
 
already considered and rejected by Congress and the Court. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 41. On this issue an interesting empirical question would be to determine 
how often and in what contexts the Court and its members have employed 
different meanings for two-word phrases in different statutes, or whether the 
“policy” of giving the exact same meaning in such situations is really such an 
imperative.  Indeed, the Court offers no express normative justification for this 
putative imperative. 
 42. See Kieff & Mossinghoff supra note 40 (reviewing court resistance to the 
statutory changes). 
 43. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in 
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 31-32. 
 44. See Kieff, supra note 14 (collecting sources and discussing debate about 
the use of property rules or liability rules to protect IP and the relative roles of 
transaction costs and coordination benefits). 
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administrative refusal in the post-socialist economies of Eastern 
Europe can lead to insufficient use and development of real 
property.45  The second, called “behavioralism,” explains how 
individuals may fail to act in their own rational self-interest because 
instead of being perfectly rational they are merely boundedly 
rational in that they all suffer from cognitive biases, employ 
heuristics, and so forth.46 
While interactions among the different forms of IP may 
generate problems, the reality of so many goods and services 
successfully coming to market throughout the history of IP despite 
being correlated with more than one form of IP right—such as cars 
or computers—suggests that concerns about these problems may 
be overblown, at least in theory.  What is more, the essential focus 
of a comparative institutional analysis is on the relative costs and 
benefits of different analytical frameworks.47 
Importantly, relying on both anticommons and behavioralism 
concerns raises a number of significant costs for IP in addition to 
the cost outlined above of curtailing, if not potentially eviscerating, 
the IP regimes that are both properly justified and authorized.  
Furthermore, the benefits of responding to anticommons and 
behavioralism concerns are not as great for IP as they may be for 
other regimes. 
One important additional cost that arises when applying an 
anticommons analysis to IP is administrability.  There rarely is a 
one-to-one correlation between an IP right and a particular good 
or service over which a transaction may occur in the marketplace.  
As a result, transactions over most goods and services trigger more 
than one IP right and potential anticommons problems.  No 
decisional framework is offered in the literature or the cases for 
determining when anticommons concerns should trump and when 
they should not. 
In addition, the explanatory benefit of the anticommons 
 
 45. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 79, 87-89 (2001) (drawing the definition of 
anticommons from Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998), and building on the 
discussion of IP rights from Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998)). 
 46. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its  
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (reviewing 
behavioralism and collecting sources). 
 47. See Kieff, supra note 14. 
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approach is inapposite to IP.  The anticommons is merely correlated 
with an increasing number of potential “no” votes available to block 
use of a given asset.  But the sheer number of potential votes is not 
the causative key.  Instead, it is the nature of the potential “no” that 
matters, or more specifically the nature of the “yes” that can be 
exchanged in lieu of “no.”  The anticommons approach is well-
adapted for the problems of the post-socialist economy where 
property rights are ill-defined and many administrative and 
regulatory agents can say “no” to a given use but cannot openly 
negotiate over permission, or “yes,” which would implicate 
concerns over selling votes, graft, bribing an official, or some other 
criminal act.  In contrast, absent undue court action, IP rights are 
better defined and they can be openly traded and licensed.  
Indeed, the potential for sale or license of an IP right is often the 
most important element of the private value of that right to its 
owner.48  Simply put, while an apparatchik in the post socialist 
economy might like to sell permission, there are extensive and 
important limitations on a person’s ability and incentive to 
determine and obtain the highest value that could be extracted in 
exchange for the permission.  Owners of IP rights and those 
interested in the subject matter they cover know what those rights 
are and can openly negotiate with each other in competitive 
markets for transactions over their sale or license.49 
One important additional cost to responding too quickly to 
behavioralism concerns in the context of IP is that judges are 
individual human beings, too, and so are also merely boundedly 
rational. In addition, judges, like legislators, regulators, and 
executives, are also subject to the added cost of public choice 
problems.50 
Indeed, each of the cases discussed above may to some extent 
 
 48. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 
(2001); F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125, 146-50 (2003) 
(discussing why even patents on multiple gene fragments do not present 
anticommons problems). 
 49. See F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125, 146-50 (2003) 
(citing F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001)). 
 50. See Paredes, supra note 46 (pointing out countervailing behavioralism 
problems for government actors, as well as public choice problems, and collecting 
sources). 
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be seen as examples of judges, as ordinary human beings, simply 
being bounded in their efforts to be totally rational in paying 
attention to the details of any particular legal regime—IP in these 
cases.  It also may be possible that they are examples of ordinary 
human beings who have been subjected as ordinary government 
actors to the public choice pressures of the particular parties 
arguing before them in each case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Far from suggesting that the ultimate business outcome in 
these cases should have been different, this essay makes a 
comparative institutional point about the precedential impact of 
their reasoning.  While these cases may suggest that the body of IP 
law and the legislatures that promulgated it are out of touch in 
some way with present theories of the Court’s jurisprudential 
approaches, the central goal of the essay is to show how the Court’s 
approaches have wrought serious impact on the basic fabric of IP 
regimes in a way that frustrates the important ex ante incentives and 
coordination benefits the regimes are designed to provide. 
 
